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Self-awareness? Why Neonatal Imitation Fails to Provide Sufficient Grounds for Innate Self-and Other-Awareness." It raises both empirical questions about the data from the original studies, as well as phenomenological questions about how we should interpret that data. Welsh marshals evidence against key tenets of the studies by Meltzoff and colleagues, first challenging whether the studies show imitation at all; and if they do, objecting to the claim that these results indicate the presence of "primitive" versions of phenomenological structures present in the goal-oriented imitative behaviors displayed in older children and adults. She argues that we must consider the possibility that neonate imitation is a phenomenologically unique mimetic behavior which requires a unique description and explanation, in particular one that does not depend on invoking the phenomenology of body image and the sort of self-other distinction implied in it.
As Welsh notes, insofar as Meltzoff and Moore's studies successfully establish neonatal imitation, the claim that they demonstrate a neonatal body schema is relatively uncontroversial.
The claim that they establish the presence of a body image is much more contested (Welsh 225) . 4 The inference to nativism has also drawn criticism. Lymer's 2011 article, "Merleau-Ponty and the Affective Maternal-Foetal Relation," challenges Meltzoff and colleagues' equation of behaviors present at birth with behaviors that are "innate," correcting for the neglect of the maternal body, pregnant experience, and in utero development in the accounts offered both by Merleau-Ponty and by Meltzoff and colleagues. She offers an account in which a maternal body schema inculcates fetal kinesthetic rhythms during gestation by means of an "affective bodily incorporation" of the fetus into the mother's movements-for example, rocking to calm fetal distress (129).
Another familiar claim from imitation studies that has drawn compelling opposition is the assertion that the sort of body schema necessary for imitation is incompatible with self-other Shiloh Whitney indistinction. Taking a position that is especially interesting for its refusal to insist on the mutual exclusivity of self-other distinction and indistinction, Maclaren's 2008 article, "Embodied Perceptions of Others as a Condition of Selfhood?" criticizes work in phenomenology and recent developmental psychology that rejects notions of infant self-other indistinction and insists on distinct selfhood as an organizing feature of infant phenomenology. 5 Maclaren explains that while it is uncontroversial among her interlocutors to concede that infants do not distinguish between their own and others' minds, the theorists she mentions share an interest in positing a specifically perceptual sense of distinct self in infants (66). While Maclaren does not directly engage with the work on imitation by Meltzoff and colleagues, their work clearly falls within this research program. Maclaren applauds the premium her interlocutors place on a notion of embodied, perceptual subjectivity, but objects that they have imported the Cartesian assumptions they hoped to abandon when they insist that the phenomenology of the embodied subject always involves a sense of self-possession or "mineness" and distinctness from others (67).
Maclaren offers her own argument in support of Merleau-Ponty's claim that the individuation of lived experience is not given from the start, but must develop. Analyzing a different set of empirical studies on infants' perceptual engagements, she concludes that especially but not exclusively for very young children, other people's sensory-motor orientations are directly perceivable, and the feelings and movements that make up those orientations are infectious. In a word, there exists a curious indistinction of the aspects of experience that traditional views regard as private, exclusive to myself or an other: "other people's intentionality orients us" (80). The attitudes and expressions of others can overtake me, so that to perceive them is to participate in them. This sort of indistinction, Maclaren argues, precedes and conditions the infant's perceptual sense of her own distinctness, but is not incompatible with it.
Indeed, it is participating in an other's orientation toward the infant that enables her to develop an orientation toward her self as such.
This critical work suggests a need for entertaining phenomenologies of infant and neonate behavior that share credit for the infant's movement with the influence of others-that is, that situate it within self-other indistinction. Meltzoff and colleagues may have too hastily dismissed the possibility that neonate imitation could be a co-authored behavior, a behavior that is produced by an intercorporeity. Because they observed repeated imitations that involved closer approximations, they concluded that imitation is a goal-oriented activity: that the infant is correcting its expression to more closely match the adult's. 6 That implies a movement organized by a qualitative distinction between inside and outside, self and other, interoception and exteroception. They controlled for the possibility that the corrections they observed were responses to encouraging feedback from the adult. 7 But this does nothing to control for the influence of the maternal body schema that Lymer describes. Nor does it control for the influence that interests Maclaren: the influence the very perception of the adult's expression exerts on the infant's own perception and movement. What I discover is that it is crucial to understand both distinction and indistinction in terms of their affective significance. In the critical literature I have discussed above, affect is a theme as persistent as it is difficult to pin down: for Lymer, affect is the medium of the maternal body schema's influence over the material it incorporates. For Maclaren, sympathy is the means through which one person's attitudes and orientations can overtake and inhabit those of another.
Welsh discusses alternative accounts of imitation that position it in one case as "affectmirroring" and in another as affect "regulation" (228-230). The role of affect in this discussion clearly deserves more attention.
My contention is that what Merleau-Ponty calls self-other indistinction is a virtual or imaginary participation in others' embodied orientations including the felt and motor aspects of their experience, a participation that he defines as an affective phenomenon. Further, I contend that Merleau-Ponty's account of the advent of the body proper-the aspect of the body image that constitutes a perceptual sense of the body as a distinct and private space-theorizes that as an affective innovation. Rather than being a fact of which we at first are ignorant and gradually grow to recognize, distinction from others in the sense that is important to Merleau-Ponty is a situation that must be cultivated and maintained through the negotiation of affective distance and proximity. Again, affect plays a key role: it is in our adult affective attachments to others that we negotiate and cultivate self-other boundaries and intimacies. The affective dimension of adult relationships is a life-long project of working out the relation of distinction and indistinction. Crucially, Merleau-Ponty claims that without sympathetic indistinction we cannot account not only for the precociousness of imitation, but also for the later experience of others as such. As adults whose perception has become organized according to a qualitative distinction between private and public spaces, between the interoceptive aspects of a perception that I feel "in here" and the exteroceptive aspects that I see "out there," we think of the adult's smile as a spectacle whose felt aspects are private, and we create not only the puzzle of invisible imitation, but also the classical problem of the experience of others. Merleau-Ponty's solution is to say that the division between inside and outside that generates this problem is not as inflexible as the classical prejudices of psychology would have us believe. Without doubt, social life often involves struggling to translate others' more complex and inscrutable conducts. But this cannot be the earliest experience of others. For in order to inspire such efforts on our part, others' appearances and movements must first distinguish themselves from mere spectacle by making themselves felt as conducts.
The earliest experience of others must not be an experience of the other as other, on the outside of an inside-outside divide. It must rather be the experience of a conduct that makes itself felt directly, through sympathy rather than translation or comparison. The earliest experience of the other must be a kind of induction into her attitudes and behaviors, such that I participate in the feelings her gestures radiate. Sympathy shows itself in gestures of imitation, a "[m]imesis" which, Merleau-Ponty writes, "is the ensnaring of me by the other, the invasion of me by the other; it is the attitude whereby I assume the gestures, the conducts, the favorite words, the ways of doing things of those whom I confront" (PP 145).
This aspect of Merleau-Ponty's work is what Maclaren invokes when she argues for a self-other indistinction in which "other people's intentionality orients us" (80). If Merleau-Ponty is right in his anti-Cartesian claim that the embodied status of intentionality means it is not hermetically private but rather tends to be directly perceivable, then when we say (for example)
that we see someone looking at something, that need not be a euphemism for having inferred that they are looking. Rather, we can actually see them seeing. When "we pass someone on the sidewalk apprehensively gazing upwards, we tend to feel quite unreflectively moved to look upwards too" (79) would not be possible without this "transfer" of conduct found in pre-communicative sympathy (PP 118). Insofar as we become able to see others as such, to communicate dialogically and "smile back" when they smile, this is not only because we learn to see bodies as interiorities, private lives distinct and external to each other, but also because our adult vision of others still functions as sympathy. Just as Merleau-Ponty distinguishes "genuine communication" from "pre-communication," he distinguishes "a genuine sympathy" that is "at least relatively distinct" from the initial, childlike sympathy (PP 120).
As adults, what we see others doing still functions to mobilize feelings-again in both the motor and affective sense-in our own bodies. But it works according to an "adult sympathy" that "occurs between 'other' and 'other'; it does not abolish the differences between myself and the other." Quite the contrary: "on the basis of this initial community … there occurs a segregation, a distinction of individuals" (PP 119) . And yet this segregation also does not abolish the indistinction between myself and the other, for it is "a process which, moreover … is never completely finished." Thus, even in the adult perception of others, there is still transfer: "conduct which I am able only to see," Merleau-Ponty writes, "I live somehow from a distance" (PP 118).
Take note of that language of distance: Merleau-Ponty will describe the feeling of alterity, the learned and perpetually negotiated distinction between self and others, in terms of a "lived distance," distinguishing it from the one-time discovery of a given and pre-determined boundary (PP 154). Not only does Merleau-Ponty think that child perception begins with an indistinction of self and other, he thinks adult experience continues to be a potentially disorienting mixture of distinction and indistinction, a "distance" that is "lived"; not fixed and discovered once and for all but negotiated. The "dizzying proximity of others" that characterizes child perception is "pushe[d] … farther away rather than suppress[ed] … altogether" (PP 154).
We push others farther away (or draw them closer), we become people that are more or less intimate with and sensitive to particular people or contexts or issues, and in that sense the selfother distinction is quite real; but not as a brute or fixed fact, and not in a manner that is inconsistent with the persistence of indistinction.
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In his influential study of the body image, Schilder notes that manifestations of both motion and emotion have a tendency to provoke similar reactions in others (244, 245 The type of mimetic behavior Schilder associates especially with the behavior of children, crowds and animal groups he calls a "sympathetic induction of emotion and feeling …
[or] of an affective state" (244). As in Merleau-Ponty's lecture, Schilder also uses the example of the infectious smile: "the sight of a smiling face," he writes, "provokes a smile" through a kind of induction of the feeling, even when the child is "at an age at which they cannot be credited Similarly, when Merleau-Ponty returns to a discussion of mimesis later in the lecture emphasizing that it operates through sympathy, he says that sympathy relies on a body schema or "postural function" that is not private, not owned by the child's body personally, but is rather an intercorporeal system "unit[ing] my body, the other's body, and the other himself [sic]" (145).
In order to understand these claims, we must distinguish between two stages and functions of the body schema: one which is intercorporeal, and one which is proprioceptive. At first the body schema serves as a system of equivalencies between perception and movement. It Merleau-Ponty's reference to a period before the body schema is "total" posits a time before the body schema has incorporated interoception as a totality, a closed and insular interior domain separated from the domain of exteroception and given the special and exclusive status of "mine." The earliest form of the body schema that Merleau-Ponty posits, and that he attributes to the imitating infant, is a body schema that conducts the reversibility of perception and movement, which will only later be qualitatively distinguished as interoception and exteroception (when it will continue to function as a conductor between them such that they "reciprocally express" or stand in for each other). It does not yet distinguish them into private and public zones. As I will argue in the concluding section, that will require an affective investment in a body image.
Understanding this early form of the body schema is the key to understanding Merleau- Child perception is characterized by a "ubiquity" (PP 129, 139) or "identity at a distance" (PP Shiloh Whitney 139), a coexistence of interoceptions in multiple places on the perceptual field at once.
Interoception for her has not yet fixated on what she will later feel to be its privileged location:
her own body, le corps propre.
III. Interoception, exteroception, and imagination as adult sympathy
So what becomes of that first function of the body schema in adult perception? In "Eye and Mind," Merleau-Ponty recounts an experience of the mirror image borrowed from Schilder. As bizarre as this doubling of one's felt sense of place sounds, it is readily repeatable. For instance, executing complex motor tasks using a mirror-like shaving or applying make-uprequires coordination between two sets of motor feelings: one that takes place in my actual fingers, and another that takes up residence in the phantom fingers in the mirror.
Schilder's mirror experience betrays a weakness in the hold the body proper's felt insularity exerts over the organization of our adult perceptions. It allows us a glimpse into what perception was like prior to the advent of the body proper, but it also reveals an undercurrent of adult perception in which the childlike felt sense of place is still at large, possessed of a mobility that is the adult form of "ubiquity" (PP 139). 18 The mirror image is crucial in this Sorbonne lecture, not only because of the mirror stage, but also because the mirror image, Merleau-Ponty writes in that lecture, "even for the adult … is mysteriously inhabited by me" (PP 132). For
Merleau-Ponty the mirror stage, like the reduction, cannot be completed. The mirror's ability to mobilize the child's interoceptions so that they cathect on a privileged location as her own depends on its ability to solicit the child's sympathy, offering her "a 'phantom' life in the mirror"
(PP 134). It is this function of the mirror Merleau-Ponty is emphasizing when he writes that just as the child "feels that he [sic] is in the other's body … he feels himself to be in his visual image" (PP 134).
Both Merleau-Ponty and Schilder claim that we can witness this ubiquity in adult life, not only in perceiving ourselves in the mirror, but also in perceiving others and the world around us.
Merleau-Ponty's late essay "Eye and Mind" is dedicated to arguing that depth perception is only possible on the basis of this ubiquity. 19 The things I merely see, Merleau-Ponty writes, are also felt: they "have an internal equivalent in me; they arouse in me a carnal formula of their presence" ("Eye and Mind" 164). This "carnal formula" conditions the emergence of perceptual depth. It enables perceived objects to appear in terms of their hidden sides. It supplies the force of the feeling Merleau-Ponty calls the perceptual faith: the feeling that perception has placed me in the presence of the real. proper identifies the felt sense of place, the interoceptive body, as inner, even in adult experience the feeling body, the interoceptive body, is not contained within the boundaries that have captivated it. And this is why "even for the adult the image is never a simple reflection of the model; it is, rather, its 'quasi-presence'" (PP 133), animated with interoceptive feelings, that mobilize its affective force and let it appear as a kind of physiognomy.
IV. Conclusion: The affective assumption of the image
Crucial to understanding Merleau-Ponty's position about child perception as indistinction is that the indistinction he speaks of is not only a spatial indistinction, but an affective one. It is not just a failure to make a spatial distinction. It is rather an affective intimacy: an unguarded tendency to induct affects. This is why Merleau-Ponty insists that childhood indistinction is not "egocentri[sm]" (PP 119). The child is not simply attributing to others feelings that really belong to her. Indeed, she has no feelings that are properly her own. Thus, to incorporate the self-other distinction into perception is not only to begin experiencing spaces as yours vs. mine, it is also to begin experiencing feelings as yours vs. mine.
Merleau-Ponty's account of child perception follows Henri Wallon's very closely until the pivotal mirror stage, when he rejects Wallon's description in favor of a more Lacanian one that privileges its "affective significance" (PP 137). In this stage, the child is supposed to learn to see the mirror image in the adult manner, withdrawing her interoceptive participation in it so that the image no longer enjoys its own spatiality, but instead serves to indicate her own body as the privileged headquarters of all her perceptions. Wallon, Merleau-Ponty reports, treats this as an intellectual development: as the child learns how the mirror works, she comes to understand it as a reflection. But he objects that this approach fails to appreciate "the affective significance of the phenomenon."
One part of what Merleau-Ponty means by this is that an affective force must be mobilized in order for the child to invest her embodied perspective in a body image. In order to feel the image as her own, it is not enough that the child learns the facts about reflective surfaces. of the body image, we see imagination cast as that adult form of sympathy, the one that includes distance.) The development at issue here, the transformation wrought in the child's perception, is not primarily an intellectual acquisition, but an affective investment.
But the emphasis on the "affective significance" of the transformation is an emphasis, not only on the role of affect as means and medium of the development, but also on the affective results of this development. The transformation changes the way the child feels feelings. It introduces "a sort of wall between me and the other: a partition" (PP 120). But this "wall" or "partition" is not only a partition in the child's experience of spaces. It also reorganizes her experience of affects. "There is no longer," Merleau-Ponty writes, "that dizzying proximity of others" (PP 154). Instead a "'lived distance' divides us," allowing room to perceive others' feelings without them encroaching on the intimate space of my own feelings.
But just as the mirror is a lasting reservoir for the experience of ubiquity it helped to suppress, it is in "the realm of feelings" that the childlike indistinction and mixture of self and other persists most tenaciously (PP 155). Love, for instance, forges between people "an undivided situation" akin to that of childhood, joining me to an other such that I "suffer from her suffering" (PP 154). Affective forces carve into relief the imaginary geography of perception that allows me to say "this is mine, this is yours." And just so, affective forces can forge intercorporeal situations in which these boundaries are once again fully at stake, situations in which " [o] ne can no longer say 'This is mine, this is yours'" (PP 154) If affective forces intervened to institute a felt sense of privacy in one's body, then whether for better or for worse, they retain a power to renegotiate it.
Thus on Merleau-Ponty's account of the phenomenology of child perception, not only is the self-other distinction an affective development rather than an innate possession, it is also not a terminal accomplishment. In our valid concern with the politics of difference, we might choose to protect self-other boundaries at an ontological level, or by positing them as fixed phenomenological structures. Merleau-Ponty's notion of "indistinction" offers us an opportunity to reflect on the possibility that in fact our boundaries have to be negotiated and protected at an interpersonal and intercorporeal level. It is possible, he suggests, to really undo my boundaries in a relationship; for better or worse, to re-introduce that "dizzying proximity" with an other, and genuinely lose my bearings on what is my own. Not only our spatial boundaries but also our affective ones are vulnerable and negotiable. Adult sociality and difference is an imaginary geography whose contours surface in the circulating currents of affective forces. The assumption of the body image institutes a phenomenological structure for addressing a question of distinction which is never finally answered.
If Merleau-Ponty is right that distinction and indistinction coexist, this opens an intriguing set of questions about how to understand intercorporeal difference and the experience of alterity. In my view, by the end of Merleau-Ponty's lecture some tension has accrued between the model of alterity as a "wall" or "partition," and the model that casts it as a "lived distance." If it is true that our relations with others as such will always involve a certain amount of sympathy, and that there is fundamental structural instability in the experience of self-other difference as a "wall," that feeling of absolute integrity our sense of privacy can sometimes presume; then it follows that the wall, the border or partition, is not the right model for all of our experience of intercorporeal difference. There must be an operation of differentiation in childhood and in intimate adult relationships that is not finally or fully describable as the parsing of territories, the assertion "this is mine, this is yours." There must be a more intimate dynamic of difference that accommodates the micropolitics of the negotiations that transpire when the question of boundary has been relaxed, a differentiation that gives rise to-perhaps consists of-the many variations and mixtures of affective intensity and valence through which the intimacy of a relationship is incarnated; a differentiation that is not a matter of drawing borders, but rather persists and even thrives in even the most intimate, shared space. 2 What is significant about this dual claim is that while the body schema is a system of motor capability-that is, a system of motor equivalencies between perception and movement (thus, between movements that are seen and movements that are undergone or felt, or between a moving body and the motor possibilities afforded to it by its situation)-the body image includes the perceptual experience of one's body as one's own. That is, body image experience is proprioceptive awareness in the narrowest sense: a body image is always of a body proper. Merleau-Ponty's lecture posits a body schema from the time that he thinks external perception begins-thus, he already thinks that as long as there exists external and internal perception to be coordinated, that coordination is underway. However, he says that this body schema is "fragmentary" and only gradually becomes "total" , meaning that it does not at first involve the integrated consciousness of one's body as one's own that is part of the development of body image. Welsh points out that the attribution of a body image to the neonate is a considerably more controversial claim (225). Meltzoff and Moore observed in neonates is in fact imitation properly so called, infants' exteroceptive capabilities and the coordination of these with their interoceptive capabilities must be capable of mimetic behavior, and they must in fact have a body schema. However, according to my reading of the Sorbonne lectures, so far this correction is of small consequence for Merleau-Ponty. In fact, the claim that there is an initial neonatal phase in which interoception and exteroception are not yet correlated can be excised from his account as a friendly amendment. For this correction fits well with his account of child perception as characterized primarily by an indistinction of interoception and exteroception, such that the advent of adult proprioception constitutes a reorganization of perception that distinguishes interoception and exteroception, with the distinction of self and other as corollaries. Indeed, as I read him it was awkward for MerleauPonty to maintain along with his contemporaries that the initial neonatal phase involves the absence of exteroception and the non-integration of interoception and exteroception-in other words, the absence of any body schema to speak of. If we must posit interoception and exteroception as co-present from birth in order to account for neonate imitation, then so much the better for Merleau-Ponty's account of child perception as characterized by their indistinct copresence. The much stronger and more contentious claim that Meltzoff and colleagues make is that neonate imitation involves, not only a body schema, but also a body image. A body image includes a body proper: a sense of one's body as the bordered and private space of a self.
13 I have suggested comparing them on the basis of the parallels between their concepts; also, as I explain in the next section, references to Schilder on related topics continue to appear in Merleau-Ponty's later work. Yet since they wrote during roughly the same period, we might also take an interest in the puzzle of how the directions of influence actually ran at the time. Since The Image and Appearance of the Human Body was published in 1950, the year Merleau-Ponty gave his lecture on the child's relations with others, it would no doubt be anachronistic to cite that work as the precedent for Merleau-Ponty's discussion of sympathy in the lecture I am discussing here. He must have been familiar with it by the time he wrote "Eye and Mind," since he there recounts an anecdote of Schilder's that appears in the 1950 book. However, he may have encountered key concepts and claims of Schilder's-and perhaps the anecdote as well-much earlier through the work Schilder published in German. While Image was Schilder's first major work to be written in English and the one circulated most widely as well as most remembered in subsequent decades, we must not forget that Schilder had been publishing on related topics in German for decades. It is known Merleau-Ponty was already familiar with that work at the time he taught at the Sorbonne, since he cites it in The Phenomenology of Perception. Schilder is also said to have influenced Lhermitte, whose L'Image de notre corps Merleau-Ponty cites on relevant topics in the Sorbonne lecture under discussion. But no doubt the most direct influence on Merleau-Ponty's notion of sympathy and mimesis (second to Wallon himself) was Max Scheler. See Scheler's discussion of mimetic behavior, sympathy, and "fellow-feeling" in the early chapters of The Nature of Sympathy. As I have already mentioned in noting the distinction between communication and "pre-communication," Merleau-Ponty cites Scheler in the relevant section of the lecture.
14 The full quote runs: "Emotions are in themselves connected with expressions and are in themselves connected with the emotions of others. We perceive … their expressions which are expressions of emotions, and emotions are emotions of personalities. These are primary data. They are not secondary to the building up of our own postural model of the body, and I have shown in detail how much the postural model of the body is dependent on what we see and experience in others" (247-48). 15 See PP 115-123, especially 123: "The consciousness of one's own body is thus fragmentary at first and gradually becomes integrated." See also CPP 247-249: "No total body schema yet exists," and "[c]onsciousness of one's own body is first of all fragmentary" (249). 16 The full quote continues: "The mirror's ghost lies outside my body, and by the same token my own body's 'invisibility' can invest the other bodies I see. Hence my body can assume segments derived from the body of another, just as my substance passes into them: man [sic] is a mirror for man" ("Eye and Mind" 168, see also 278) . 17 The full quote runs: "I sit about ten feet away from a mirror holding a pipe or a pencil in my hand and look into the mirror. I press my fingers tightly against the pipe and have a clear-cut feeling of pressure in my fingers. When I look intently at the picture of my hand in the mirror I now feel clearly that the sensation of pressure is not only in my fingers in my own hand, but also in the hand which is twenty feet distant in the mirror. Even when I hold the pipe in such a way that only the pipe is seen and not my hand, I can still feel, though with some difficulty, the pressure on the pipe in the mirror. This feeling is therefore not only in my actual hand but also in the hand in the mirror… the body is also present in my picture in the mirror. Not only is it the optic picture but it also carries with it tactile sensation. My postural model of the body is in a picture outside myself. But is not every other person like a picture of myself?" . 18 See also the description of this mirror experience in the Sorbonne lecture: "the body is at once present in the mirror and present at the point where I feel it tactually" (PP 139-140). See also CPP 251. 19 The term "ubiquity" reappears in "Eye and Mind" (170). 20 See also CPP 254.
